Abstract-We study gender spillovers in career advancement using eleven years of employer-employee matched data on white-collar workers at over 4,000 private sector workplaces in Norway. Our data allow us to define seven hierarchical ranks that are consistent across plants and over time and track promotions even for individuals who change employers. We find positive spillovers across ranks (flowing from higher-ranking to lower-ranking women) but negative spillovers within ranks. The finding of narrower gender gaps in promotions for workers with more female bosses suggests that policies that increase female representation in corporate leadership can have spillover benefits to women in lower ranks.
I. Introduction
A LTHOUGH women comprise nearly half of the labor force across OECD countries, they remain dramatically underrepresented among business leaders. Eight percent of employed men in OECD countries have managerial responsibilities, but only 4% of employed women do. At the highest levels of leadership, women hold only 5% of CEO positions in Fortune 1000 companies. 1 The gender gap in leadership is even present in Nordic countries, where only 3% of CEOs at the 145 largest companies are women (Zander, 2014) and women are just 6% of general managers in public limited companies in Norway.
This paper studies white-collar private sector workers in Norway to examine a potential source of the gender gap in leadership: gender differences in career progression as a consequence of path dependence from male dominance of workplace hierarchies. Specifically, we measure the spillover effects of increasing female representation at different organizational ranks on gender differences in promotion rates using comprehensive data on over half a million worker-year observations across 4,000 plants from 1987 to 1997. 2 Rather than focusing exclusively on how the highestranking women (top executives or board members) affect lower-ranking workers, we consider the entire organizational hierarchy of white-collar workers and changes in the female share of two groups of coworkers: peers at the same rank and bosses at a higher rank.
Gender spillovers from bosses might be positive because higher-ranking women serve as mentors, role models, and advocates for their lower-ranking coworkers (Athey, Avery, & Zemsky, 2000) or because promotion decisions are affected by the taste-based or statistical discrimination of current leaders (statistical discrimination may be affected by the gender of bosses if people are better at evaluating the work performance of others who are more similar to them; Aigner & Cain, 1977) . Increasing female representation at higher ranks could also improve promotion rates for lowerranking women by weakening the associations of leadership with masculinity (Koenig et al., 2011) . These theories for positive spillover suggest that men's historical dominance of business leadership is self-perpetuating, but that it can be disrupted by increases in female shares at higher ranks.
Although policymakers and advocates often assume that gender spillovers from bosses are positive, it is worth noting that they need not be. The spillovers from female bosses can be negative if the ''queen bee'' phenomenon is common. This happens when a woman who achieves career success in a male-dominated field blocks other women from advancing (Staines, Tavris, & Jayarante, 1974) . Although women are often expected to be more favorable judges of other women's work, 3 there is evidence of the opposite pattern in some male-dominated fields, which could also lead to negative spillovers, as in Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) .
Gender spillovers among peers can also be positive or negative. Women may be more willing to compete against other women (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003) , leading to increasing female performance and promotion rates when the peer group has more women. However, unlike a laboratory setting with individual tasks, workplaces often involve both individual and cooperative tasks. While it is possible that women collaborate more with other women, it is also possible that women feel that their closest competitors for promotion are other women. This could happen, for example, in response to tokenism at workplaces or informal limits on the number of women in higher ranks (Kanter, 1977; Dezs} o, Ross, & Uribe, 2016) . In that case, women might be less cooperative with one another than with men, which could lower their relative promotion rates. This form of sex discrimination in promotions, through which female workers are competing most intensively with their female peers to be promoted into positions occupied by female bosses, would imply negative gender spillovers within ranks but positive spillovers from higher-ranking to lower-ranking women.
We find that women in our sample experience a significantly lower annual likelihood of advancing a rank than do their male counterparts, after controlling for a wide range of individual characteristics and workplace fixed effects. The gap is reduced when there are more female bosses in the next highest rank, but it is increased when there are more female peers at the same rank. These results are consistent across a range of models with different sets of control variables and fixed effects and are robust to alternative definitions of female leadership shares.
Although previous studies have measured gender spillovers in hierarchical organizations, we are first to measure effects of both types of coworkers on promotion rates in corporations. The only other paper we are aware of measuring effects of the gender mix of peers and superiors on promotion rates is Karaca-Mandic, Powell, and Maestas's (2013) study of gender and racial spillovers among the lowest-ranking enlisted members of the U.S. Army. Although that setting is quite different from ours, it is interesting that the pattern of gender spillovers observed in that study is the same: positive effects of female superiors but negative effects of female peers.
Papers that have focused exclusively on downward-flowing gender spillovers on promotion rates, such as Blau and DeVaro (2007) and Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2011) , tend not to find significant effects. In contrast with those studies, we use panel data on workers across all ranks and include controls for the worker's current rank and the female share among peers. This last variable is positively correlated with female leadership, but its estimated effect on female promotion rates is negative. Its omission can therefore be a source of downward bias in the estimated effect of female bosses. Our finding of positive spillovers from female leaders is more in line with the results from studies that examine the representation of women at different organizational ranks (e.g., Kurtulus & TomaskovicDevey, 2012; Matsa & Miller, 2011) . Our paper also contributes to a broader literature on how female business leaders affect lower-ranking workers, including recent studies of compensation levels, gender pay gaps (Flabbi et al., 2014; Tate & Yang, 2015; Cardoso & Winter-Ebmer, 2010) , employment, and downsizing (Matsa & Miller, 2013 .
II. Data Description
Our data set is derived from Statistics Norway's register data and from plant-level job surveys compiled by the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO, Naeringslivets Hovedorganisasjon), the primary employer association in Norway, for 1987 Norway, for to 1997 Our estimation sample includes workers at private sector firms that are NHO members, which overrepresents manufacturing but retains broad coverage. In 1997, NHO employees represented 37% of all male workers and 27% of all female workers in Norway. We restrict our sample to white-collar workers to ensure a comparable set of jobs with a substantial presence of both male and female workers. Women comprise 30% of the sample of workers below the top rank, who have a chance of promotion. Like any other employment-based sample, ours is limited to current workers and excludes people who are unemployed or out of the labor market. Workers on temporary leave from a job, such as parental leave, however, are included in the data.
Several features of our data enable us to study how gender spillovers affect promotions. The data contain detailed job information that allow us to assign workers to one of seven hierarchical ranks that are defined consistently across plants and over time. Hence, our sample includes a wide range of employers, unlike many studies of gender gaps in promotions that focus on a single firm (e.g., Ransom & Oaxaca, 2005; Giuliano et al., 2011; Jones and Makepeace, 1996) . We observe the population of workers at each plant, which enables our analysis of gender spillovers. We are able to track workers over time and across plants in the sample, meaning that we can also observe promotions that involve a change of employer. These features are not typically available in samples based on household or firm surveys that include multiple firms (Olson & Becker, 1983; Blau & DeVaro, 2007) , 5 and they allow us to control for unobservable differences in promotion rates between workplaces and for the worker's current rank using a wide range of fixed effects. We also have detailed information on worker characteristics that we include as controls.
The main weakness of our data source relative to sources used in some previous studies of promotions (such as Blau & DeVaro, 2007 , and several of the single-firm analyses) is that we do not observe performance reviews or evaluations for workers. Although it is possible that these (often subjective) evaluations themselves reflect (possibly unconscious) gender bias on the part of evaluators, 6 having that information would have enabled us to distinguish between promotion gaps driven by differences in evaluation scores and those caused by women needing to meet higher performance benchmarks to advance. This latter situation can arise when the positive signal from a high evaluation is perceived as less precise when applied to women: risk-averse supervisors may then prefer to promote men over equally scoring women (Aigner & Cain, 1977) . Without this information, the gender spillovers we measure could potentially include both of these effects. 4 The job survey was conducted to obtain an overview of earnings among employees; response rates among surveyed plants were very high because employers were legally bound to participate. We use the longest time period that our key variables are available and include workers born between 1936 and 1969. For more details about the data source, see Lønnsstatistikk for funksjonaerer, an annual publication. 5 Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997) use a cross-sectional sample and define prior promotions implicitly using rank and education. 6 Ibarra, Carter, and Silva (2010) discuss gender bias in evaluations in the corporate setting. Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) also find evidence of gender bias, but in their setting, evaluators are harsher on candidates of their same sex. Evaluations for promotions into management positions may be further influenced by stereotypical associations between masculinity and leadership (Koenig et al., 2011) .
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A. Gender Differences in Promotion Rates
We define a promotion in year t as a job change between years t and tþ1 that entails an increase in rank. Worker ranks include seven hierarchical levels that are determined using information drawn directly from NHO survey responses about each worker's occupational group, task level, and job description. Within each occupation, 7 up to seven task levels are distinguished, ranging from unskilled and routine tasks in the lower levels to high-skill and leadership tasks in the higher levels. Not all occupations span all task levels; some are concentrated in the lower levels, while others are in the higher levels. Because the task levels are designed for comparisons within occupational groups, we also use information on the detailed job descriptions to assign ranks in a way that ensures comparability across occupational groups. Table 1 reports the distribution of workers across ranks.
Following the empirical literature on promotions, we focus on binary measures of progress. We separately consider measures of internal promotions limited to workers who remain at the same plant in period tþ1 and any promotions, which also include rank increases involving a change in plant. Internal promotions more closely match the definition used in the literature (e.g., Booth, Francesconi, & Frank, 2003) , where changing employers (with an increase in rank) is not counted as a promotion. The advantage of our second measure is that it captures a wider range of possible paths for career progression. We are able to measure this outcome because our data track workers across plants and because our seven-rank scale for hierarchies is consistent across plants and time. In our data, annual promotions of both types generally involve increases of one or two ranks. Table 1 reports additional summary statistics for our sample. Annual promotion rates are higher for men (7.3% for any promotions and 5.9% for internal promotions) than for women (6.6% for any promotions and 5.6% for internal promotions), but these raw differences actually understate the gender gaps for workers of the same rank. This is because promotion rates decline dramatically at higher ranks, dropping from 13% to 1.7% for any promotions and from 11% to 1.3% for internal promotions, 8 and women are vastly overrepresented in the lowest rank (over 80% female) and underrepresented in the highest ranks (over 90% male).
Men and women in the sample also differ along other observable dimensions that may be related to productivity and promotions. Men are, on average, older and have more formal schooling, work experience, tenure at their current workplace, and rank-specific tenure (time since initial entry or since the last promotion, whichever is more recent). They are also less likely to be working part time, which we define as usual weekly work hours under 37 over the year (defined based on contracted hours and not affected by leave taking). Not accounting for these differences could overstate the gender gap for comparable workers.
In our regression analysis, we therefore include all of these variables as controls in our models, as well as year, occupation, and plant fixed effects. After accounting for Data from NHO (1987 NHO ( -1997 and Statistics Norway. Summary statistics are reported for the entire sample and the main analysis sample that includes workers in ranks 1 to 6 and for whom we calculated the proportion of female bosses at the next highest rank. The proportions of workers within each of the ranks (1 through 7) are reported using the entire sample. Female boss share is defined for workers one rank higher.
7 The occupational groups are (a) technical; (b) production supervision; (c) administrative, including clerical, accounting, and shipping; (d) sales; (e) storage; and (f) other. 8 The pattern of lower rates of promotion from higher ranks is a typical feature of workplace hierarchies. Other evidence that our rank measure is capturing meaningful variation in job status is the increasing hourly wages, age, and years of education at ascending ranks and large year-onyear wage growth concurrent with promotions.
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these variables, we find a highly statistically significant gender gap in promotions (coefficient on a Female indicator), of À3.3 percentage points, or 50% of the female promotion rate. The gender gap for internal promotions is À2.6 percentage points (46% of the female rate, also highly significant). When we estimate expanded versions of the model with controls for family status-indicators for having any children under the age of 17 and under the age of 7 and their interactions with the Female indicator-we still find substantial and significant gaps of 2.5 (for any promotions) and 2.0 (for internal promotions) percentage points for childless women. These promotion gaps are present for workers in each of the six lower ranks in the hierarchy.
B. Gender Mix of Coworkers
We use two measures of coworker gender: (a) the female share among peers, who are workers at the same rank, plant, and year, and (b) the female share among bosses working at the next highest rank at the same plant and year. The mean female peer share is 30%, which is higher than the mean female boss share of 17%, reflecting women's underrepresentation at higher ranks. Across all observations in our sample, over 25% of workers have no female bosses and only 1% of workers have all female bosses.
Two features of our measure of female bosses are worth noting. First, the measure is based only on plant-level rates; we are not able to identify workers' immediate supervisors (as in Karaca-Mandic et al., 2013, and Blau & DeVaro, 2007) . If the effects of female bosses run exclusively within the chain of authority, then our estimates, based on a noisy measure, will tend to understate the importance of female bosses. Second, our measure of female bosses is rank specific and focuses on female representation at the next highest rank. This has the advantage of measuring effects of female leadership deep within organizational hierarchies. In a robustness analysis, we also found similar positive spillovers on promotion rates from increasing female shares two ranks higher or among the plant's top leadership, defined based on rank, earnings, or leadership job tasks.
III. Gender Spillovers in Promotions
Our main estimates of gender spillovers are reported in the top panel of table 2. They are from estimating variants of this model with different sets of controls and fixed effects (in X ijt ):
The variable FemaleSharePeers is the female share of worker i's peers at the same rank, plant j, and year t.
FemaleShareBosses denotes the female share of worker i's bosses who are one rank higher at the same plant j in year t. Each of these variables is interacted with the Female variable, which is set equal to 1 if the worker is female and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of the interacted variables are the differential effects of interest. The outcome variable is an indicator for an increase in rank between period t and (t þ 1), regardless of whether the worker also changed plants during the time. The explanatory variables are all measured in period t. Column 1 has the basic controls for year, industry, occupation, age, schooling, experience, tenure, rank-specific tenure, part-time status, and rank; column 2 adds plant fixed effects; and column 3 adds the two indicators for having children (under the ages of 17 and 7) and their interactions with the Female indicator. Column 4 addresses concerns that individuals on different promotion trajectories might sort differentially into workplaces with different coworker demographics by adding a full set of individual worker fixed effects. Across all of the models, we find significant gender spillovers in promotions. More female workers in the next highest rank are related to a smaller gender gap in promotion rates, and more female coworkers in the same rank are related to a larger gap. The female boss share interaction ranges from 0.018 to 0.021, implying a standard deviation (or 0.24) increase in female bosses increases women's relative promotion rates by about 0.5 percentage points, or 7% of their promotion rate. The female peer share interaction ranges from À0.039 to À0.062 and implies that a standard deviation (or 0.29) increase in female peers would reduce female promotion rates relative to men's by at least 1.7 percentage points, or 25%.
The positive interaction effect from female bosses is consistent with women helping women below them in the hierarchy through mentoring, serving as role models or reducing discrimination by supervisors. The finding provides indirect support for the theory that demand-side factors play a role in creating the observed gender gaps in promotion rates. It also provides some support for a key mechanism underlying public policies aimed at promoting women in business leadership positions: that female leaders tend to help lower-ranking women in their organizations.
The finding of negative gender interactions among women at the same rank, however, complicates this story of women helping women. Because many of the theories of positive gender spillovers (mentoring, sponsorship, role models, access to powerful networks) are more important for bosses than for peers, the absence of positive peer spillovers may not be surprising. As discussed above, the negative effects of female peers may come from greater competition (and less cooperation) among peers of the same sex or from women in lower ranks facing greater competition for scarce sex-specific resources such as female mentors and sponsors.
The fact that we find opposite effects of female peers and bosses helps rule out alternative stories for the positive 772 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS spillovers. Specifically, the pattern is not consistent with workers sorting based on workplace-specific gender-related omitted variables (such as female friendliness or skill in identifying and recruiting female talent) that create spurious correlations between female representation at all levels, including bosses and peers, and promotion outcomes for women. Although female bosses are associated with higher promotion rates for female workers, they appear to have no significant effects on promotion rates for males. This gender difference provides evidence against the presence of an omitted variable (time-varying, because our model includes plant fixed effects) that is related to promotion rates overall (such as corporate growth and expansion) and to female boss shares (e.g., if growing firms are able to increase diversity at higher ranks more rapidly). Unlike the zero effect of female bosses on male promotion rates, female peers are estimated to have a positive effect on male promotion rates. These positive effects for men also suggest that the negative peer effects on women are not driven by an omitted variable that is related to the female share in a rank and overall lower promotion opportunities, which would be the case if women tended to sort into dead-end job groups identifiable by their work plant, rank, and year combination.
We also conducted a wide range of robustness checks that all confirmed the main findings. These are described in detail in Kunze and Miller (2014) . One concern is that female-and male-dominated ranks differ in size, absolutely or relative to the next highest rank, and that these size differences constrain the available slots for promotions. We address this by adding controls for the size of the current and the next highest ranks. Another concern is that the effects of female peers in particular are coming from larger gender gaps in promotion at lower ranks, which we address by adding a full set of interactions between the Female and rank indicators. We also account for the possibility that women are disproportionately working in occupational groups with limited promotion opportunities by controlling for the share of workers in the next highest rank in the organization from the worker's current occupational group. We OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the plant-rank-year level. Female Boss Share is the female share of workers in the next highest rank at the same plant-year. Peer Share is for workers at the same rank in the same plant-year. Outcome variables are measured as changes from period t to t þ 1. The outcome in the top panel is an indicator for having an increase in rank, with or without a change in workplace. The outcome in the middle panel is an indicator for a rank increase within the same plant. The outcome in the bottom panel is an indicator for changing plants, with or without a change in rank. Basic controls in all columns are measured in period t and include year, rank, industry, occupation, age, and years of schooling fixed effects, as well as quadratic controls for experience and tenure, a linear control for rank-specific tenure, and an indicator for part-time status. Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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also found that our estimates are robust to controlling for plant-by-year, plant-by-rank, or rank-by-year fixed effects.
The middle panel reports estimates using the narrower promotion outcome that focuses on internal promotions within the same plant. The point estimates for the gender spillovers are consistent in sign between the two panels, with equal or larger coefficients for female bosses and somewhat smaller ones for female peers in the middle panel. However, as we note in section IIA, the gender gap in promotions, conditional on our basic controls and plant fixed effects, is larger for any promotions (3.3 percentage points) than for internal promotions only (2.6 percentage points). When computed as a proportion of the overall gender gap in promotions for each outcome, the gender spillovers for both bosses and peers are in fact consistently larger for internal promotions. The proportionally larger internal effects are plausible because the spillovers we study are largely internal to the firm.
The results in the bottom panel of table 2 show no significant gender spillovers in the probability of staying at the same workplace, after plant fixed effects are included in the model (columns 2 to 4). The significant spillover coefficients in column 1 seem to suggest that there is some sorting out of workplaces based on gender compositions of peers and bosses. However, their dramatic reduction in size and significance in the latter two columns indicates that this sorting is captured with plant fixed effects. As discussed above, these same fixed effects leave the spillover effects on promotions unchanged.
IV. Conclusion
This paper uses unique data on the gender composition of workplaces within hierarchical ranks from an elevenyear employer-employee matched panel on white-collar workers at over 4,000 workplaces in Norway to study how gender differences in promotion rates are affected by the presence of female bosses and female peers. Several theories predict that increasing female leadership can improve outcomes for lower-ranking women: lower-ranking women may gain access to better mentors and role models and professional networks. Consistent with this prediction, we find that higher shares of female workers at the next highest rank are associated with significantly smaller gender gaps in promotion. This is not due to higher relative promotion rates for women overall at firms that hire more women in all ranks (because they are more ''female friendly''). Rather, we find that having a greater share of female coworkers at the same plant and rank actually depresses promotion rates for women, relative to men. This negative effect may be caused by greater competition within gender (either between men or women) among peers, either for promotions or for gender-specific mentoring and support.
The finding that greater female representation at higher ranks narrows the gender gap in promotion rates at lower ranks supports the theory that male dominance in corporate leadership continues to present barriers to women's advancement. It also suggests that policies that promote greater female representation in corporate leadership will have spillover benefits to women in lower ranks. However, because we focus on measuring spillovers within organizations, our estimates may understate the overall importance of gender spillovers by failing to capture benefits to women at other firms. These can include mentoring that crosses firm boundaries or women helping other women progress in their careers by hiring them into their firms. Future research that combines data of the type used in this study with social network information could illuminate those cross-firm spillovers.
